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REUNIFICATION PLANNING FOR CHILDREN IN
CUSTODY OF OHIO'S CHILDREN SERVICES BOARDS:
WHAT DOES THE LAW REQUIRE?
INTRODUCTION
O HIO LAW MANDATES that each of its eighty-eight counties has a county
department of welfare or a county children services board with powers
and duties to provide appropriate care, protection or services to children whose
situations warrant such intervention.I This mandate is a reflection of society's
recognition that where there is parental incapacity to provide a safe and healthful
home environment for the children, the state has an obligation to intervene
in the children's behalf.2 For some families this ultimately results in the ter-
mination of parental rights and the permanent placement of the children out-
side the parental home.
Our society and laws presume that parents are generally more capable of
the proper care and control of their children than is the state.' Consequently,
for those parents who provide less than adequate care to their children, children
services boards have traditionally offered counselling and other appropriate,
rehabilitative services designed to strengthen the family unit and enable the
children to remain with their parents.4 Where parental inability to protect and
nurture the children is extreme, however, removal of the children may be
necessary to ensure the children's safety and well-being.I If the parents' problems
are treatable and sufficient progress can be made to enable the children's safe
return, the parents' rights can be restored.6 Nevertheless, there remains a small
minority of parents whose inadequacies and abilities to provide care are such
that reunification of the family unit is not possible.7 Because termination of
parental rights is a drastic step which should be taken only when all efforts
of rehabilitation have failed, questions arise as to when and under what cir-
cumstances the relationship between a child and his or her parents should be
permanently severed.
'OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5153.07; 5153.16 (Page 1982).
2j. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 3-4 (1973).
'Id. at 7-8.
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5153.16 (Page 1982). This statutory provision sets out the powers and duties
of county children services boards.
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(2)(3)(4) (Page Supp. 1982).
'OHio REV. CODEANN. § 2151.01 1(B)(13) (Page Supp. 1982) which sets out the definition of "temporary
custody."
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(a) (Page Supp. 1982).
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I. IMPETUS TO CURRENT LEGISLATION
Over the past twenty-five years there have been a number of major studies
focusing on the length of time children remain in situations of temporary care
and custody.' As a result of these studies, many concerns about the systems
of state intervention emerged.' These concerns included children remaining too
long in the foster care system, the lack of rehabilitative services to the parents,
and the lack of permanency for children due, in part, to inadequacies in existing
laws and inadequate funding of social service programs."
In the mid-1970's a rethinking of the entire system of state intervention
began. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 198011 provides a
basis in federal law for imposing some degree of accountability on the states
concerning enforcement of planning programs for the permanent custody of
children in order to avoid unnecessary stays in foster care. This statute further
provides for increasing the availability and delivery of preventive and reunifica-
tion services for children and their families. This law marks the most direct
federal intervention to date in child welfare policy, an area traditionally regulated
by the states.12
The impetus for permanent planning in behalf of children in placement
in Ohio was initially formalized at the State level with the passage of H.B.
156 in 1976.13 This bill reflects the legislature's concerns about children remaining
in foster care indefinitely with inadequate consideration being given to per-
manency for them, either through return to their parents or through adoption.
H. B. 156, which became effective January 1, 1977, required the initial
review of all children in care and/or custody of child care agencies within the
first four months of 1977, with annual reviews thereafter.14 The law provides
'See, e.g., H. MASS & R. ENGLER, CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS (1959); THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, CONCERN FOR CHILDREN IN PLACEMENT (1977); COMPTROLLER
GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE INSTITUTIONS - STEPS GOVERNMENT CAN
TAKE TO IMPROVE THEIR CARE (1977); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS, WHO
KNOWS? WHO CARES? FORGOTrEN CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE (1979).
9Id.
"OWald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from
Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights,
28 STAN. L. REV. 625, 627-28 (1976).
"Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified at
scattered sections of 26, 28, 42 U.S.C.)
"See Wald, supra note 10 at 633.
"This bill was codified as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.151(A) (Page 1981). This section of the statute
provides the following:
An annual review shall be made of every child placed in the care or custody of a public or
private organization, society, association, agency, or individual certified to care for children or
certified to place children pursuant to sections 5103.02 and 5103.03 of the Revised Code. This review
shall be made by the agency having custody of the child, whether the custody or care arrangemnt
is temporary or permanent, and whether the agency received custody pursuant to court order under
chapter 2151. or pursuant to section 5103.15 of the Revised Code, or whether the child is in temporary
care as a consequence of the issuance of an emergency court disposition pursuant to section 2151.33
of the Revised Code.
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.15 1(B) (Page 1981). This section of the statute contains the following
[Vol. 16:4
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that the reviews are to be handled by the juvenile court or by a five-member
county board appointed by the presiding judge of the juvenile court. 5 At a
minimum, the review is to evaluate the following: (1) the extent of the care
and support provided by the parents while the child is in temporary custody,
(2) the extent of communication with the child by the parents, (3) the degree
of compliance by the agency with what is in the best interests of the child, (4)
a recommendation for the future planning for the child, and (5) the social ser-
vices being offered to the parents in order to resolve the problem which led
to the removal of the care and/or custody of their children.'
6
Following the implementation of H. B. 156, the first statewide informa-
tion became available on children in custody in Ohio. 7 Data indicated that
there were more than 14,000 children in custody, averaging 3.7 years out of
their homes. ' 8 Twenty percent of those children had been in temporary custody
as long as six years. '9 The legislators noted several major obstacles to permanency
for these children. Mary Boyle, State of Ohio Representative, stated:
language:
The annual review made by the agency having custody of a child shall be filed with the juvenile
court that placed the child or in the case of a child placed pursuant to section 5103.15 of the Revised
Code with the juvenile court of the county in which the child resides. The initial review shall be
made and submitted to the court within sixty days after placement of the child. A review shall
be made annually thereafter, except that a juvenile court may order a review to be done more
frequently ....
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.151(C) (Page 1981). This section provides the following:
The review procedures used by each agency having custody of children shall be examined and
approved by the juvenile court that receives the report of the annual review of a child from an
agency or by a five-member county board appointed for that purpose by the presiding judge of
the juvenile court. Every report submitted to the juvenile court shall be reviewed and evaluated
by the juvenile court, or the board appointed by the court, and the juvenile court or board shall,
within ninety days of the filing of the report, approve the report or order it revised. If a board
is appointed, it shall consist of one member representing the general public and four members who
are trained or experienced in the care or placement of children by training or experience in the
fields of medicine, psychology, social work, education, or related fields. Of the initial appointments
made to the board, two shall be for a term ending one year after the effective date of their
appointments, two shall be for a term ending two years after that date, and one shall be for a term
ending three years after that date. Thereafter, terms shall be for three years, each term ending on
the same day of the same month of the year as did the term which it succeeds. Each member shall
hold office from the date of his appointment until the end of the term for which he was appointed.
Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which
his predecessor was appointed shall hold office for the remainder of such term.
"These criteria are set out in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.151(B) (Page 198), and they include the
following:
(1) The extent of the care and support provided by the parents, or parent, while the child is in
temporary custody;
(2) The extent of communication with the child by the parents, parent or guardian;
(3) The degree of compliance by the agency with what is in the best interests of the child;
(4) A recommendation for the child that includes a plan for the future and permanent placement
or custody of the child, and the methods of achieving the objective. The plan shall be framed
with the objective of doing what is in the best interests of the child.
(5) The nature and utilization of any social services offered to the parent or guardian in order to
restore the home and return the child to the home, whether offered by the agency having
custody or care of the child, another agency, or the court.
"Boyle, H.B. 695: A Sponsor's Perspective in PUBLIC CHILDREN SERVICES AssOCIATION OF OHIO
NEWSLETrER (August, 1982).
"Id. at 1.
"Id.
Spring, 19831
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First, with the best intentions, and responding in part to heightened public
awareness of child abuse and neglect, and to laws requiring more frequent
intervention and removal of children from their homes, many counties
had focused scarce resources on foster care. This left little time, money
or staff to help to get the children back home safely. Second, juvenile
courts were required to follow outdated and inadequate laws to terminate
parental rights and thus free children for adoption. There were three distinct
results of these termination statutes; some counties almost never petitioned
for permanent custody; some counties petitioned but were rarely granted
permanent custody; finally, other counties almost always petitioned and
were frequently successful in receiving permanent custody.2"
The legislature drafted H. B. 695 to address these two major concerns. 2'
The bill draws on permanency planning concepts adopted in other states and
on model termination statutes drafted by the National Juvenile Judges
Association.2 In the view of Mary Boyle, one of the bill's sponsors, "[T]he
critical balance in H. B. 695 is between reunification of the child with his/her
family and termination of parental rights." 23
A different perspective on the adoption of H. B. 695 is held by Stephen
D. Freedman, Attorney for the Franklin County Children Services Board."
Attorney Freedman states that "H. B. 695, among other things, purports to
provide standards for granting permanent custody of a child to a public agency.
But in attempting to solve one set of problems, others replaced them ....
H. B. 695 is a mixed bag." '25
Prior to the implementation of H. B. 695, the ultimate controlling factor
regarding child custody was the "best interest of the child." 26 This standard,
undefined as it was and is, allowed the juvenile courts to focus their decisions
on the children and their needs. H. B. 695, however, removes this as the con-
trolling factor and makes it just one of three areas for determination by the
courts.2 7 The other two areas for consideration by the courts are the agency's
efforts to reunite the family and the parental functioning as it relates to the
"Id. at 2.
"1H.B. 695, adopted July 25, 1980, was to "amend Sections 2151.011,2151.281, 2151.35, 2151.353, 2151.38,
and 2103.151, and to enact Sections 2151.412, 2151.413, and 2151.414 of the Revised Code to authorize
a juvenile court to grant permanent custody of a child to an agency to which it has previously granted
temporary custody, of the child upon application of the agency and a finding by the court that the child's
parents have acted, and will continue to act, in such a manner that the child is without proper parental
care or guardianship and to require certain reports and treatment plans to be filed by agencies that want
to have or have temporary custody of children."
22See Boyle, supra note 17, at 2.
231d.
"Freedman, H. B. 695 - A Two Year Retrospective in PUBLIC CHILDREN SERVICEs ASSOCIATION OF OHIO
NEWSLETTER (July, 1982).
2'Id. at 1-3.
2"In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St. 2d 100, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(A)(1)(2)(3) (Page Supp. 1982).
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child being without adequate parental care now and in the near future.28 To
make possible the court's evaluation of these factors, the law requires the child
care agencies to submit an Initial Plan and a Comprehensive Reunification Plan
in each case of temporary custody.29 These plans focus on parental respon-
sibilities such as support and visitation, consultation with agency staff, and
actions the parents are required to take. The plans also focus on the agency's
responsibility to facilitate visitation and provide needed services to the child
and parents.30
The problems raised by these various requirements are numerous. To ex-
amine some of the difficulties raised by this legislation and the consequent
disparity in application by the courts, this paper analyzes fourteen Courts of
Appeals cases from ten counties throughout the State of Ohio. The topics for
discussion fall into three general areas. The first of these is the retroactive appli-
cation of the law's requirements. The second area includes the three factors
to be considered by the courts in any motion for the permanent custody of
a child. These factors encompass the efforts required by agencies to reunite
families whose children have been temporarily removed, including the special
problems presented by incarcerated parents. These factors also examine parental
functioning, including what constitute the requirements of "adequate parental
care" and "in the near future" 'nd the "best interest of the child" standard,
including the possible appointment of a guardian ad litem to protect the child's
interests. Finally, this article examines the standard of evidence required in per-
manent custody hearings.
Before consideration is given to these various topics, however, a brief
discussion of temporary custody is necessary. Ohio's juvenile courts have ex-
clusive original jurisdiction to determine the custody of children alleged to be
abused, neglected, or dependent. 3 ' The courts, upon an adjudication of abuse,
neglect or dependency, may make one of several dispositions.32 This paper is
concerned with those children who are committed to the temporary custody
of the children services boards or to the county departments of welfare which
carry responsibility for the administration of child welfare. When temporary
custody is granted to one of these agencies, the main provisions of H. B. 695
first apply, beginning with the requirement for the submission of an Initial
Plan.33 The remaining requirements apply at specified times and upon an
agency's motion to change an order of temporary custody of a child to an order
of permanent custody.3 ' Throughout this period the parents retain rights of
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(A)(2)(3) (Page Supp. 1982).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.412(A)(B)(C)(D) (Page Supp. 1982).
'
01d.
"OHIo REV. CODE AN. § 2151.23(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1982). See also OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.03,
2151.031; 2151.04 (Page 1982) for definitions of neglected, abused, and dependent child.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353 (Page Sup. 1982).
33Id.
"Id. See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414 (Page Supp. 1982).
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visitation, obligations for support, and responsibilities to comply with court
orders directed to their rehabilitation as well as reunification of the family."
Only upon a court's grant of permanent custody are all rights and obligations
of parents terminated and the child freed for adoptive placement. 6
II. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
The question of the retroactive application of the provisions of H. B. 695
has arisen in a number of cases which have reached Ohio's courts of appeals."
Ohio law provides that a "statute is presumed to be prospective in its opera-
tion unless expressly made retrospective. ' 38 Cases which are governed by
H. B. 695 necessarily have a minimum of two court hearings, the initial hear-
ing at which an order of temporary custody is requested and, subsequently,
if temporary custody has been granted and if the agency petitions for perma-
nent custody, the hearing to consider that request. Another question then arises
as to whether the law applies only to those cases in which temporary custody
was requested after the law's effective date, October, 24, 1980, or also to those
which were initiated for purposes of temporary custody prior to October 24,
1980, but in which the motions for permanent custody were filed later. The
results in the following cases range from outright rejection of the retrospective
application 39 to consideration of its provisions without outright application,
'4
to application of a phase in provision,4 ' and to the minority position of man-
datory application regardless of dates of initial custody, motion for perma-
nent custody, or permanent custody hearing. 2
In the Stark County case of In re Cox,"3 the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's judgment granting permanent custody of an illegitimate child
to the Stark County Welfare Department on the sole basis that the "statutory
change is not applicable to actions filed before it became effective.'"4 In this
case the original complaint was filed May 16, 1980; a motion for permanent
custody was filed November 19, 1980, less than a month after the effective
date of H. B. 695. The father appealed the decision of the trial court on the
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.011(B)(l 1); 2151.412(D)(2) (Page Supp. 1982).
'
6OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011(B)(12) (Page Supp. 1982).
"In re Smith, No. 31-CA-52, (Greene County Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1982); In re Golden, No. CA 2829, (Licking
County Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1982); In re Wayne, Nos. 81AP-631, 81AP-632, (Franklin County Ct. App.
Dec. 10, 1981); In re Penrose, No. CA 2810, (Licking County Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1981); In re Cox, No.
CA 5651, (Stark County Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1981); In re King, No. 10165, (Summit County Ct. App. Nov.
4, 1981); In re Wiseman, No. CA 2797, (Licking County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.48 (Page 1982).
"In re Cox, No. CA 5651, (Stark County Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1981).
'In re Golden, No. CA 2829, (Licking County Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1982); In re Wayne, Nos. 81AP-631,
81AP-632, (Franklin County Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1981); In re Wiseman, No. CA 2797, (Licking County
Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981); In re Penrose No. CA 2810, (Licking County Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1981).
"In re Smith, No. 31-CA052, (Greene, County Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1982).
'In re King, No. 10165, (Summit County Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1981).
'In re Cox, No. CA 5651, (Stark County Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1981).
4Id. slip op. at 3.
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basis that H. B. 695 required the agency "to adopt a plan ... looking toward
the ultimate reuniting of the family. . . .,,"I The court of appeals rejected the
argument, and while it also discussed the best interests test, it affirmed on the
"bare legal basis" that the law could not be applied retroactively." 6
Three additional cases from the Fifth Appellate District, all Licking County
cases,4 7 reached the same resolution. In the case of In re Wiseman, three
assignments of error were made. The first two alleged the trial court's failure
to comply with the provisions of Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.412 requir-
ing the agency to submit and follow a plan "generally calculated to reunite
and rehabilitate the family unit."" The court of appeals noted that the statute
upon which the appellant relied was enacted two years after the temporary
custody award and overruled the assignment of error not only because the
appellant father failed to raise the issue in the trial court but because it would
have been "fatuous to consider that the government should have attempted
a plan to reunite these children with their father who was imprisoned for abusing
them." The court also found a third assignment of error to be "patently without
merit." 4
9
The second Licking County case, In re Penrose,"0 followed Wiseman. In
this case temporary custody of four children had been granted to the welfare
department February 6, 1979, following the death of the father and the mother's
inability to provide proper care. On May 20, 1981, the Common Pleas Court
granted permanent custody to the welfare department. The trial court noted
its consideration of the mandate set forth in Section 2151.414 and indicated
that there was a written contract which set forth the specific areas of improve-
ment the mother needed to meet in order to achieve the return of her children
and with which the mother had failed to comply.5' The court of appeals, in
affirming the trial court's grant of permanent custody, noted it had previously
held that Section 2151.414 "is not applicable to dependency or neglect pro-
ceedings commenced prior to its effective date." 52 It, nevertheless, also found
that the trial court "substantially complied with the objectives of that statute
and the mechanisms set forth therein for the implementation thereof."5" The
third Licking County case, In re Golden, 14 also held that Section 2151.414 was
"5Id.
46Id.
"In re Golden, No. CA 2829, (Licking Co. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1981); In re Penrose, No. CA 2810, (Licking
County Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1981); In re Wiseman, No. CA 2797, (Licking County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
"In re Wiseman, No. CA 2797, slip op. at 2, (Licking County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
"Id. slip op. at 2.
"In re Penrose, No. CA 2810, (Licking County Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1981).
"Id. slip op. at 3.
52ld.
5'ld. slip op. at 5.
"In re Golden, No. CA 2829, (Licking County Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1982).
Spring, 1983]
7
Blank: Reunification Planning
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
AKRON LAW REVIEW
not effective with respect to proceedings commenced before its first effective
date (October 24, 1980).
The Greene County case of In re Smith55 was appealed on two grounds,
one of which was the alleged failure of the Greene County Children Services
Board to meet the requirements of Sections 2151.412, 2151.413, and 2151.414.
In this case temporary custody had been granted September 6, 1979. On
February 20, 1981, the Children Services Board moved for permanent custody
of the children. The trial court granted permanent custody June 22, 1981. The
court of appeals quoted Section 2151.414, which requires a Comprehensive
Reunification Plan at the time of the second annual review of any child in
temporary custody upon the effective date of the act (October 24, 1980).56 The
court of appeals reasoned that the Board's motion for permanent custody was
filed after the first annual review (required under H. B. 156) on September
18, 1980, and prior to the second annual review. It said, "Ergo, there was no
necessity that a written comprehensive reunification plan as contemplated by
O.R.C. 2151.412 be prepared." 57 The court of appeals added that the Board,
nevertheless, had "indeed complied with the spirit of the Code sections in
issue"5" and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
A Franklin County case, In re Wayne,59 was appealed on four assignments
of error. One of these concerned "changes in Ohio law regarding permanent
commitment.""0 Temporary custody of two brothers had been granted to the
Franklin County Children Services Board immediately after their respective
births in 1977 and 1979. On May 1, 1979, motions for permanent custody were
filed, and the case was heard by a referee who recommended permanent commit-
ment to the Children Services Board. The trial court so ordered. The court
of appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for a new dispositional hear-
ing. This second hearing took place April 9, 1981, and resulted in an award
of permanent custody. At the time of the first dispositional hearing, H. B.
695 was not yet in effect; by the time of the second dispositional hearing, it
was. 61 The court of appeals concluded that under the new statutory scheme,
three factors 62 must be considered but that the court, under Section 2151.414(B),
"In re Smith, No. 31-CA-52, (Greene County Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1982).
"Id. slip op. at 4. The court quoted the following language:
The second annual review made after the effective date of this act of any child who is in temporary
custody upon the effective date of this act pursuant to a court order under Chapter 2151. of the
Resived Code or pursuant to section 5103.15 of the Revised Code, which annual review is made
pursuant to section 5103.151 of the Revised Code, shall include a comprehensive reunification plan
prepared in accordance with division (D) of section 2151.412 of the Revised Code for the child
if he is not abandoned or orphaned, a report on the attempts made to locate the parents of the
child if he is an abandoned child, or a report on the attempts made to find a relative of the child
who will take permanent custody of the child if he is an orphaned child.
57/d.
"Id. slip op. at 5.
"In re Wayne, Nos. 81AP-631 and 81AP-632, (Franklin County Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1981).
"Id. slip op. at 2.
"Id. slip op. at 11.
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(A)(1)(2)(3) (Page Supp. 1982).
[Vol. 16:4
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"may grant permanent custody of a child if the court determines by clear and
convincing evidence that the child is without adequate parental care and will
remain so in the near future."63 The court said H. B. 695 changed the pro-
cedure by which the dispositional hearing on remand was to be conducted but
did not affect any of appellant's substantive rights. The court of appeals found
no prejudice to appellant in the trial court's application of the best interest
rule since the "factual findings lead to the same result under the new statute.' '64
As a minority of one, the Summit County Court of Appeals made a retroac-
tive application of the provisions of H. B. 695 when it overturned the decision
of the Summit County Juvenile Court to grant permanent custody of Lisa and
Brian King6 to the Summit County Children Services Board. The trial court
had granted temporary custody May 10, 1979, and on September 9, 1980, the
Children Services Board had filed a motion for permanent custody. A hearing
was held November 24, 1980, and was continued until February 9, 1981. On
March 16, 1981, an order of permanent custody was issued. The court of appeals
examined the new provisions of Sections 2151.412 and 2151.414 and concluded
their application was mandatory.66 In response to appellee's assertion that its
motion was filed prior to the effective date of Sections 2151.412 and 2151.414,
the court said the filing date of the motion for permanent custody was "not
determinative." 67 Instead, it held that Sections 2151.412 and 2151.414 are pro-
cedural and remedial in nature, rather than substantive and therefore not sub-
ject to the Ohio Constitutional prohibition of passage of retroactive laws. 68
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was sought to determine whether
the statutes enacted in H. B. 695 should be applied retroactively, but the supreme
court declined to hear the matter. 9
It is apparent that the legislature contemplated the situations presented
in Smith and King. 70 Smith appears to correctly apply the law, postponing the
requirement of a Comprehensive Reunification Plan until the "second annual
review made after the effective date of this act of any child who is in tem-
porary custody upon the effective date of this act .. . .",1 The King court
appears not to have considered the application of Section 3, which could have
enabled them to affirm the trial court's decision.
"In re Wayne, slip op. at 15.
"Id.
"In re King, No. 10165, (Summit County Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1981).
"Id. slip op. at 4.
"Id. slip op. at 7.
6OHIO CONST. art. I1 § 28 states that "[t]he general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws,
or laws impairing the obligation of contracts; but may, by general laws, authorize courts to carry into
effect, upon such terms as shall be just and equitable, the manifest intention of parties, and officers, by
curing omissions, defects and errors, in instruments and proceedings, arising out of their want of conformity
with the laws of this state."
"In re King, Summit Co., 11/4/81, No. 10165, Motion to Supreme Court for Jurisdiction overruled 2/28/82.
"In re Smith, slip op. at 4.
7.Id.
Spring, 19831
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III. GOOD FAITH EFFORT
Under the provisions of H. B. 695, one of the three determinations the
trial courts must make is whether the agency holding temporary custody of
the child(ren) has made a good faith effort to implement plans for reunifica-
tion of the child(ren) with the parents.7" What does "good faith effort"
encompass? An analysis of the available cases yields a wide variance in
application of standards.
In the King73 case the court found that the failure of the Children Ser-
vices Board to submit an Initial or Comprehensive Reunification Plan (a re-
quirement the court applied retroactively) was sufficient to demonstrate a lack
of good faith on the part of the agency to reunite the family. It refused to
consider the Board's efforts with the mother independent of its failure to file
the required plans with the court. The court also did not elect to apply the
"best interests" standard.
The opposite approach was taken in the Wayne7" case where the court
said "[a]lthough implementation of a reunification plan is a factor to be con-
sidered (in whether the Franklin County Children Services Board had made
a good faith plan for reunification), such a plan is not required in order to
permanently commit a child."" The court discussed the efforts made by the
agency and indicated that while the plan did not work, due to the mother's
retardation and inability to develop appropriate parenting skills, its failure was
not due to any lack of good faith effort on the part of the agency.
The Scioto County Court of Appeals reversed an award of permanent
custody in In re Skaggs." The trial court found that the mother had not
developed any plan nor taken any lasting measures to reform and rehabilitate
herself so that she could be rejoined by her children. The trial court also found
"meager attempts" by the Scioto County Children Services Board to rehabilitate
her and reunite her with her children, but concluded that the mother had the
greater duty to rehabilitate herself.77 The court of appeals disagreed, saying
the Children Services Board has an affirmative duty to attempt to rehabilitate
the family." Although thise case was initiated prior to the adoption of H. B.
695 (October 24, 1980) the court of appeals did not render its opinion untils
several months after the bill's effective date. 9 The court of appeals was obviously
influenced by the legislation, emphasizing the requirement of the good faith
effort on the part of the agency to reunite.8 0 The case seems to typify the view
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1982).
"In re King, slip op. at 5.
"In re Wayne, Nos. 81AP-631 and 81AP-632, (Franklin County Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1981).
"Id. slip op. at 16-17.
"Id. slip op. at 4-5.
77Id. slip op. at 4-5.
7 SBId
.
"In re Skaggs, No. 1278, (Scioto County Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1981).
1Id. slip op. at 5-6.
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of the courts that the greater duty for rehabilitation of the parents rests with
the agencies, rather than with the parents themselves. This contradicts the
generally held theory that persons who do not wish to modify or improve their
behavior will not do so, regardless of the efforts others may pursue in their
behalf.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF INCARCERATED PARENTS
A special problem is presented in cases where one, or both, parents are
incarcerated at the time of the temporary or permanent custody hearings. Can
an agency make a good faith effort to reunite a family where the parent is
imprisoned and unavailable to visit or support his or her children and to meet
with the caseworker? The law does not appear to permit a waiver or a postpone-
ment of the requirement to file plans of reunification under such a situation.8
On the other hand, might the courts consider it an act of bad faith for the
agencies to file a plan calling for actions the parent could not possibly meet
by virtue of his or her incarceration? At least one court of appeals has already
found a lack of good faith in an agency's failure to file plans of reunification
under these circumstances.82 Might the courts view the required actions of the
parents to be of no effect until the parent is free to begin work on the reunifica-
tion plan? Courts of appeals have reached totally opposite results in determin-
ing agencies' responsibilities in reuniting families where parents are
incarcerated.3
In the case of In re Tan, 4 the Summit County Juvenile Court granted
temporary custody of Joanna to the Children Services Board on April 3, 1980,
as the result of extensive physical abuse. The mother had pleaded no contest
to one count of felonious assault and had been found guilty and sentenced
to three to fifteen years in prison. The father had pleaded no contest to one
count of endangering children and had been found guilty and sentenced to one
and one-half to five years in prison. In August, 1981, while both parents were
still incarcerated, the Children Services Board filed a motion for permanent
custody. The agency had timely submitted the two plans required under Ohio
Revised Code Section 2151.412. The court of appeals pointed out that Section
2151.412 provides for any party to object to the reunification plan.85 No ob-
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.412 (Page Supp. 1982).
"In re Ratcliffe, No. 80CA5, (Gallia County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
"Id. Compare In re Wiseman, No. CA 2797, (Licking County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981) where the court
found no lack of good faith by the agency which had not filed a reunification plan because the father
was incarcerated.
"In re Tan, No. 10654, (Summit County Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1982).
"OOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151 412(E) provides the following:
(E) Any party to the action and the court may file a motion with the court requesting that
an initial plan or comprehensive reunification plan prepared pursuant to this section be modified.
The court shall notify all parties to the action that the motion has been filed, and any party to
the action may, within seven days after receiving the notice, file an objection to the motion, the
court shall incorporate the modification of the plan into the judgment entry setting forth the
disposition made of the child if no objection to the modification is filed within the seven day period.
If any party files an objection to the modified plan, the court shall consider the issues raised by
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jection had, however, been filed. It was on this basis that appellant's assign-
ment of error was overruled. The court went further to say that, in the absence
of a good faith effort to reunite, a Children Services Board can demonstrate
such an attempt to be futile. The court went on to note that the record in the
case demonstrated the futility of rehabilitative efforts for this family.86 In this
case the court seemed to be impressed by the extent and effects of the abuse
suffered by the child and the parents' subsequent imprisonment based on these
acts. As a result two questions arise. Would the same result have been reached
if the parents' incarcerations were not directly related to acts against the
child? Even more importantly, should there not be provision in the law
that no reunification plan be required when the abuse is of such magnitude
that the precarious state of the child's physical and emotional health prohibits
any attempt to reunite him or her with the parents? The Tan case suggests that
situations do exist where reunification should not be attempted.
In a Gallia County case, In re Ratcliffe, I7 the court of appeals found the
Children Services Board to be lackng a good faith effort to reunite a family
whose father was imprisoned. The agency had received temporary custody of
the children on November 30, 1977, and had filed a motion for permanent
custody February 19, 1980. Following an award of permanent custody, the
father appealed on the basis of the trial court's failure to provide for his per-
sonal appearance at the hearings, either by granting a continuance until he was
eligible for release from prison or by procuring his release from present in-
carceration to attend the hearings. The court of appeals stated that whether
or not his presence denied him due process was not dispositive of the case.
It said that the more important issue, which was not addressed by either side,
would be considered sua sponte by the court. 8 This is the issue of the Children
Services Board's statutory duty to rehabilitate and reunify the family once the
children are in the temporary custody of an agency.
The court of appeals found little or no attempt on the part of the Gallia
County Children Services Board to rehabilitate Mr. Ratcliffe into a family setting
in the event he would be released from prison. 9 Mr. Ratcliffe was not, however,
released nor was he expected to be released for two years. The court took a
"dim view" of this alleged failure and commented in its opinion that:
If Mr. Ratcliffe had been sentenced to life imprisonment, or a term of
years which would unquestionably keep him incarcerated until each of
the objection, and may hold a hearing on the modified plan within fourteen days after the objection
is filed. If the court approves any modification of the initial plan or the comprehensive reunification
plan, the court shall incorporate the modification of the plan into the judgment entry setting forth
the disposition made of the child.
"In re Tan, slip op. at 7-8.
"
7In re Ratcliffe, No. 80CA5, (Gallia County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
"Id. slip op. at 2.
"Id. slip op. at 3.
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his children were 30, then this court could perhaps understand (but not
condone) the actions of Childrens Services. This is not the case here because
Mr. Ratcliffe will be released from Chillicothe in 1982. He will have served
his time and paid his debt to society for the crime he committed. However,
if we accept Childrens Services' position, Mr. Ratcliffe will pay for his
crime for the rest of his life, by being deprived of his children.90
It is to be recalled that one of the main problems to be rectified by H. B. 695
was the lessening of the length of time children remain in foster care, either
through return to their parents or placement into a permanent, adoptive home.9'
In the Ratcliffe case, the children had already been in temporary custody over
two years when the agency decided to pursue a permanent plan for them. The
father was still two years away from release, and even upon release it would
be unrealistic to assume that he would be in a position to resume the immediate
care of three children. Thus, the Ratcliffe children continued to be deprived
of parents. As Stephen D. Freedman states, "Children need parents when they
are children, not potential parents later in their lives .... Children left in tem-
porary care limbo, do not develop in the same way as children who have a
permanent, secure home, either with natural parents or adoptive parents.' '92
Although the court in the Ratcliffe case said incarceration is not, by itself,
a ground upon which permanent custody may be granted to Children Services,
the court of appeals in Wiseman93 had no such difficulty. In that case the father
was imprisoned, and the court found the evidence "overwhelming" that "the
boys are now dependent by reason of the incarceration of their father." 9 The
father was imprisoned as a consequence of his abuse of the two daughters.
Recall from prior discussion of this case that the court determined it "fatuous"
to consider that the agency should have even attempted a plan of reunification
under these circumstances.95
These opinions span the possibilities, from finding no need whatsoever
for the agency to attempt reunification96 to an absolute postponement of per-
manent planning for the children until the parent is freed from prison or until
the children become adults. 97 One factor to be considered in such situations
might be whether the incarceration is related to the criminal neglect or abuse
of the children, as was the case in Tan and Wiseman. Even if the act resulting
in imprisonment is not specifically directed to the children, however, any criminal
activity ought to be considered by the courts in their evaluation of a parent's
"Id. slip op. at 4.
9'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5153.16 (Page 1982).
"See Freedman, supra note 24, at 3.
"In re Wiseman, No. CA 2797, (Licking County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
"Id. slip op. at 3.
9d.
"In re Tan, No. 10654, (Summit County Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1982).
"In re Ratcliffe, No. 80CA5, (Gallia County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
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functioning and ability to provide proper care for his or her children. 9 In sup-
port of its finding the Ratcliffe court used a 1929 case, In re Konneker, which
states that "Parents have a right to the custody of their children, the same
as they have a right to the possession of property they may acquire .... 99
As long as such archaic thinking persists, it appears that children will be viewed
as chattel and their needs and best interests will be subordinated to the stated,
but not necessarily acted-upon, desires of the parents. This is clearly not the
position taken by the Ohio Supreme Court in In Re Cunningham10° where the
court held that once a child has been found dependent, the best interests of
the child are the primary consideration in determing whether an award of per-
manent custody to the department of welfare is justified. The supreme court
said a separate finding of parental unfitness is not a prerequisite to an award
of permanent custody. 0 H. B. 695, thus, places the value of the Cunningham
decision at issue through its emphasis on the additional factors of the agency's
good faith effort to reunify the family and of the parents' responsibility to
follow rehabilitative plans designed to effect reunification.
V. ADEQUATE PARENTAL CARE
A second area for determination by the courts when agencies are requesting
permanent custody of children already in their temporary custody is whether
the parents have acted in such a manner that the child is a child without ade-
quate parental care and will continue to be a child without adequate parental
care." 2 As can be seen, adequate parental care means something different in
every case and in every court. However, the legislature defined adequate parental
care as "the provision of adequate food, clothing, and shelter to ensure a child's
health and physical safety and the provision of specialized services warranted
by a child's physical or mental needs." 0 The question can still be asked, "What
is adequate?"
Another question which arises is what does "in the near future" mean?
The Ratcliffe court made it clear that an incarceration of a parent until the
youngest child turned 30 was insufficient for them to approve a permanent
plan for the children apart from the parents. 04 The Wayne case indicated that
four years was a long time to leave small children in limbo.0 5 To be borne
in mind might be two factors, namely, the intent of H. B. 695 to reduce the
length of time children spend in temporary care and custody' 6 and, secondly,
"1OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1982).
"In re Konneker, 30 Ohio App. 502, 505, 165 N.E. 850, 853 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929).
0059 Ohio St. 2d 100, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).
"Id. at 108, N.E.2d at 1038.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1982).
'1OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011 (B)(17) (Page Supp. 1982).
"04In re Ratcliffe, slip op. at 4.
'"In re Wayne, Nos. 81AP-631 and 81AP-632, slip op. at 17, (Franklin County Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1981).
"'See Bayle, supra note 17.
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the long-term damage which results to children who are deprived for signifi-
cant periods in their young lives of the security that comes only with having
a permanent family." 7
In determining whether the parents have acted and will continue to act
in a manner to make their child one without adequate parental care, the law
requires the court to consider all relevant factors, including but not limited
to five considerations:
(a) [t]he extent to which the parents of the child have conformed to the
initial and comprehensive reunification plans .... ;
(b) [a]ny existing emotional or mental disorders of the parents and the
anticipated duration of the disorders;
(c) [a]ny physical, emotional, or sexual abuse of the child by the parents
that occurs between the date that the original complaint alleging
abuse was filed and the date of the filing of the motion for permanent
custody;
(d) [a]ny existing excessive use of intoxicating liquor or drugs by the
parents;
(e) [a]ny physical, emotional, or mental neglect of the child by the parents
that occurs between the date that the original complaint alleging
neglect was filed and the date of the filing of the motion for permanent
custody.' 8
The Wayne case stated that the evidence showed that the appellant mother
was unable to provide adequate food, clothing, and shelter for herself, much
less for two small children.' 9 It stated further that the evidence showed she
was unable to provide the stimulation, nurturance and stability the children
required and that she had been totally resistant to the counselling and training
which might help her to improve.
In responding to an assignment of error claiming lack of evidence that
Joanna Tan"' would continue to be a child without adequate parental care,
the Summit County Court of Appeals found the record "replete with expert
testimony expressing grave doubt about the ability of these parents to ever pro-
vide adequate parental care of Joanna'""' It thus found that Joanna "is now
and will continue to be a child without adequate parental care."I 2
Another Summit County case, In re Smith," 3 held that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to show that the child, Rachel, would continue to be a child
1
°TSee J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, supra note 2 at 31-52.
'01OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(A)(2)(a)-(e) (Page Supp. 1982).
'"In re Wayne, slip op. at 17.
"*In re Tan, No. 10654, (Summit County Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1982).
1"Id. slip op. at 8.
"'Id. slip op. at 9.
"'In re Smith, No. 10335, (Summit County Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1982).
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without adequate parental care. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's
award of permanent custody and reinstated the temporary custody award. The
court of appeals based its opinion, not on evidence concerning the parents'
ability to adequately care for Rachel, a child whose developmental delays were
such that she required specialized care, but on the parents' ability to provide
for a younger child in the home. 4 The court stated that:
Throughout the term of the temporary custody the Smiths have
demonstrated little capacity to understand Rachel's disability and none
of the skills necessary to ensure Rachel's continued development ....
The only major deficiency that the Smiths have yet to overcome
appears to be in their ability to meet Rachel's special needs. This, of course,
is an area which can be improved through the involvement of support
agencies. " I
In this case the court viewed the child within the parental home as not without
adequate parental care and assumed that because the parents were caring for
one "normal" child, they could provide adequate care for Rachel, despite its
own statement that the parents had none of the skills necessary to ensure Rachel's
continued development." 6 Among the factors to be considered by the courts
in such situations include whether parents able to care for one or more children
are necessarily able to meet the needs of and provide adequate care for all other
children they might have, particularly those children with special needs. Another
factor to be considered is the length of time the child will continue in a tem-
porary custody situation. In Rachel's case, at the time of the appeals hearing,
she had already spent twenty-four of the twenty-eight months of her life in
foster care. To reinstate the temporary custody award meant to extend that
time even further. For this child and doubtless for others whose awards of per-
manent custody have been overturned as the result of various provisions of
H. B. 695, the legislature's intent appears thwarted.
VI. BEST INTERESTS
Prior to the implementation of H. B. 695, the ultimate controlling factor
in cases of child custody between parents and public agencies was the overall
"best interests of the child.""' 7 It is now just one of three factors for
consideration." 8 The applications by the courts of these factors concerning a
good faith effort on the part of the agency to reunite the family coupled with
parental ability to provide adequate care, have yielded widely ranging opinions.
One question which arises immediately in the context of the new legislation
'Id. slip op. at 7.
" sId.
'61d.
"'In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St. 2d 100, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(A)(2)(3) (Page Supp. 1982).
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is whether the best interests of the child are always served by continued paren-
tal custody. Obviously, they are not, but, with two of the three matters for
consideration focused on the agency and on the parents, it would seem that
the best interests of the child is now a lesser consideration. Clearly, it is, at
least, no longer of paramount importance.
The best interests standard was challenged in In re J.S.R."9 as unconstitu-
tionally vague. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in upholding the
lower court's termination of the mother's rights, said that although the stan-
dard lacks precise meaning, it is not without content and bounds.' 2 ° The court
of appeals said it was "plain that the standard 'best interest of the child' re-
quires the judge, recognizing human frailty and man's limitations with respect
to forecasting the future course of human events, to make an informed and
rational judgment, free of bias and favor, as to the least detrimental of the
available alternatives.'" 2 ' Although the consitutional challenge was unsuccessful,
an analysis of this definition yields little in the way of limits and guidelines
to be applied in reaching a best interests standard, but leaves the court wide
discretion in its determination of what is in the child's best interests.
The impact of H. B. 695 is evident in the Smith'22 case where the Summit
County Court of Appeals acknowledged the special needs of the child and the
parents' lack of skills in meeting those needs. The court, nevertheless, in reversing
the award of permanent custody, disregarded the best interests standard and
instead based its opinion on the view that the child would not continue to be
a child without adequate parental care.' 23
Likewise, the Ratcliffe'2" court overlooked the best interests rule and con-
sidered only the effects of the permanent custody on the parents. The King'25
court considered nothing more than the lack of the Initial and Comprehensive
Reunification Plans in its retroactive application of Ohio Revised Code Section
2151.412 and never looked to the best interests of the children.
One case giving little more than passing notice of the best interests standard
is Cox, 2 which actually affirmed the permanent custody award on the basis
of the inapplicability of the new provisions of H. B. 695. It did, nevertheless,
acknowledge the best interests of the child as the "pole star" in these cases
and found the trial court's judgment "consistent with that cardinal principle."' 27
''In re J.S.R. 374 A.2d 860 (D.C. 1977).
"'Id. at 863.
12,Id.
"2In re Smith, No. 1033, (Summit County Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1982).
"'Id. slip op. at 7.
"'In re Ratcliffe, No. 80CA5, (Gallia County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
"'In re King, No. 10165, (Summit County Ct. App. No. 4, 1981).
"'In re Cox, No. CA5651, (Stark County Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1981).
"'Id. slip op. at 3-4.
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The Franklin County case of Wayne 2 ' applied the best interests standard
along with the other two test of good faith effort and parental functioning.
It concluded by saying that "[b]oth children need a stimulating, stable and
supportive home which appellant cannot provide now or in the conceivable
future. Thus, it is in their best interest to be permanently committed for pur-
poses of adoption."' 29
The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled on a "best interests" case in July, 1979,
in In re Cunningham. 30 Although the court acknowledged that the termina-
tion of the rights of a natural parent should be an alternative of last resort,
it said that such a disposition is nevertheless sanctioned when it is necessary
for the welfare of the child.' 3' It emphasized that a consideration of the best
interests of the child should not enter into the initial factual determination of
dependency but that it becomes a proper focus in determining whether an award
of permanent custody to the department of welfare is justified.'32 The court
specifically compared the concepts of parental unfitness and best interests, saying
that they are not always unrelated issues. 33 The court said further that "[t]he
mere fact that a natural parent is fit, though it is certainly one factor that may
enter into judicial consideration, does not automatically entitle the natural parent
to custody of his child since the best interests and welfare of that child are
of paramount importance."' 34 As noted previously, however, the value of this
opinion is at issue since the adoption of H. B. 695.
VII. APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN AD LITEM
H. B. 695 also provides for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
protect the interest of the child pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section
2151.414.' " Children in custody proceedings in Ohio have traditionally been
represented by the agencies filing actions in their behalf and by the legal represen-
tatives of those agencies.' 36 However, with the concerns about the system of
state intervention came questions about the motives of the agencies. They were
viewed as suspect; and, consequently, the guardian ad litem provision was placed
in the law to provide representation by an unbiased party. I The guardian ad
"'In re Wayne, Nos. 81 AP-631 and 81 AP-632, (Franklin County Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1981).
9Id. slip op. at 18.
1359 Ohio St. 2d 100, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).
"'Id. at 105, 391 N.E.2d at 1038.
12Id. at 107, 391 N.E.2d at 1039.
13Id.
1"Id. at 106, 391 N.E.2d at 1038 (emphasis in original).
1"1OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(B) (Page Supp. 1982).
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5153.16 (Page 1982).
13'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(B) (Page Supp. 1982). This section provides the following:
The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the interest of a child in any proceeding
concerning an alleged abused or neglected child, and in any proceeding held pursuant to section
2151.414 of the Revised Code.
The court shall require such guardian ad litem to faithfully discharge his duties, and upon
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litem, therefore, provides another kind of representation for the child. The
law does not, however, require that the guardian ad litem be a person of legal
background. Whether the representation by a lay person will prove beneficial
in these circumstances remains to be seen. As yet, there is little data to illustrate
the impact of the guardian ad litem, whether this be an attorney or lay person,
in the permanent custody proceedings. One county in the state, Summit, has
utilized trained, volunteer guardians ad litem for nearly two years. Although
statistics have not been compiled which specifically compare the recommen-
dations of the guardians ad litem with the requests of the Children Services
Board, it is the impression of the Assistant Prosecutor who represents the
Children Services Board that the recommendations of the guardians ad litem
support the agency's plan for the children in the vast majority of the cases. 38
Agencies may take some comfort in knowing that their standards for children
are given support by an independent evaluator.
VIII. CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
Following an analysis of the factors which the courts must now evaluate,
a final area for consideration is the standard of evidence to be applied in per-
manent custody proceedings. On March 24, 1982, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that due process requires states to establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence allegations supporting an action to terminate parental rights.'39
Ohio law had incorporated this standard with the adoption of H. B. 695 on
October 24, 1980.141 (Prior to this a preponderance of the evidence was re-
quired.) Wayne'' attempted to assert a proof beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard when a severance of the parent-child relationship was sought. The Franklin
County Court of Appeals overruled the assignment of error without comment.
Clear and convincing evidence is defined as "that measure or degree of
proof which is more than a mere 'preponderance of the evidence,' but not to
the extent of such certainty as is required 'beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal
case, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or
conviction as to the facts sought to be established."' 2 Legal practitioners know
his failure to do so shall discharge him and appoint another. The court may fix compensation for
the service of the guardian ad litem which shall be paid from the treasury of the county.
"'Conversation with Jacqueline Barnhart, Assistant Prosecutor, Summit County Prosecutor's Office. Ms.
Barnhart's additional impression is that the volunteer guardians ad litem utilize a "common sense" approach,
as opposed to a legalistic approach, in evaluating what is in a child's best interest.
139Stantosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 498 (1982).
"*OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page Supp. 1982). This section provides a clear and convincing evidence
standard for an initial finding of abuse, neglect or dependency. Prior to the adoption of H.B. 695, this
standard was not expressly applicable to a later proceeding in which an agency was requesting the permanent
custody of a child previously found abused, neglected or dependent and placed in their temporary custody.
In re Fassinger, 43 Ohio App. 2d 89, 334 N.W.2d 5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974), aff'd, 42 Ohio St. 2d 505,
330 N.E.2d 431 (1975), held that the granting of permanent custody requires a contemporaneous finding
of dependency, thus invoking the clear and convincing standard of § 2151.35. This was codified with the
adoption of H.B. 695, in § 2151.414(B).
"In re Wayne, slip op. at 2.
1221 0. Jur. 2d Evidence § 699 (1956).
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that clear and convincing evidence is nothing more than what the judge says it is.
Despite the rule of law that an appellate court will not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the trial court,'13 Ohio's courts of appeals have done so in
a number of custody cases involving standards of evidence.' 4 4 To be recalled
is the Smith'4 5 case, in which the Summit County Court of Appeals found in-
sufficient evidence to determine that Rachel would continue to be a child without
adequate parental care. This was the court of appeals' view notwithstanding
the demonstration of the parents' incapacity to understand the child's disability
and lack of skills in regard to her care.
The Hamilton County Court of Appeals found no clear and convincing
proof to warrant the award of permanent custody by the Hamilton County
Court of Common Pleas to the Hamilton County Welfare Department in the
case of In re Hall. 1', The court found "no more than a passing consideration
... to maintaining the family unit" and the record "silent on the possibility
of keeping the two children with the mother and the prospects of the mother's
being capable of the care and support of both children." '47 The court of appeals
stated also that there was insufficient evidence to permit an application of the
guiding principle of the child's own best interests. The court considered the
positive steps the mother had taken to improve her situation and found "nothing
in the record" to convince it that her rights and duties must be terminated
permanently. 4
The Ninth District Court of Appeals overturned the Wayne County Court
of Common Pleas award of permanent custody to the Wayne County Children
Services Board in In re Dillon. 1 The trial court found that there had been
repeated and good faith effort by the agency to maintain Dennis Dillon, Jr.,
in a home with his parents. The court also found that the father had provided
no support and that both parents had shown extremely little effort to meet
the requirements of care for the child. Finally, the court found that the parents
had abused the child who was thus without proper parental care and would
continue to be a child without adequate parental care, and that in the best
interests of the child the parental rights should be terminated.' 50 As had occurred
in the Smith"'' case, the County Children Services Board had not petitioned
"MIn re Hall, No. C-800 #149, slip op. at 2 (Hamilton County Ct. App. July 8, 1981).
"'See In re Spears, No. 1095, (Athens County Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1982); In re Smith, No. 10335, (Summit
County Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1982); In re Dillon, No. 1747 (Wayne County Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1981); In re
Hall, No. C-800149 (Hamilton County Ct. App. July 8, 1981).
"'In re Smith, No. 10335, (Summit County Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1982).
"'In re Hall, No. C-800149, (Hamilton County Ct. App. July 8, 1981).
"'Id. slip op. at 3.
"'Id. slip op at 4-5.
"1'In re Dillon, No. 1747, (Wayne County Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1981).
"'Id. slip op. at 2-3.
"'In re Smith, No. 10335, (Summit County Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1982).
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for custody of another child in the parental home. The court asked whether
it were fair to assume that if the Board deemed the home fit for one child it
ought to be fit for the other child. ,52 The court's answer, however, was obtained
by reviewing Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.031 (C)' 53 which defines an abused
child and Section 2919.22,11, the statute providing for criminal penalties for
child endangering. Because the court of appeals determined that the alleged
physical abuse did not rise to the criminal standard, it was "forced to con-
clude" that the WCCSB [Wayne County Children Services Board] ... failed
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Dennis is an abused child
within the meaning of those statutes." 55 The court of appeals did not consider
Section 2151.031(B) which specifically provides that no person need be con-
victed in order for a child to be found abused,"' nor did the court consider
the greater burden of proof required by the criminal statute. 57
In Athens County the court of appeals applied a standard of willful neglect
in the case of In re Spears5 ' and determined there was insufficient evidence
to affirm the trial court's finding of neglect and award of permanent custody.
The Children Services Board presented testimony going back seven years, and
the court said this was too remote in time to have any relevancy. The court
said this proved, at best, that the appellants were transient, something which
is not a basis for finding neglect. 15 9 An opinion, concurring in part, was con-
cerned with the only alternative left to the trial court which was return of the
children to the parents. The concurring judge said if that were the purport of
the opinion, he would dissent on the basis that the evidence was sufficient to
have supported a finding of neglect and/or dependency under other statutes. 1
6 0
While this judge concurred in the determination of insufficient evidnece to justify
a permanent custody award, it was obvious that he had misgivings about the
children's possible return to their parents. Despite the court's possibly proper
rejection of evidence from seven years earlier, the question arises as to whether
the best interests of the children are being served by continued maintenance
in a neglectful situation of seven years' duration. Past performance would seem
to be an appropriate indicator of future performance.
CONCLUSION
Through the passage of H. B. 695, the Ohio legislature has responded to
"'In re Dillon, No. 1747, (Wayne County Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1981).
1'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.031(C) (Page 1976).
1'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (Page 1982).
"'In re Dillon, slip op. at 7.
1'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.031(B) (Page 1982).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Page 1982).
"'In re Spears, No. 1095, (Athens County Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1982).
"'Id. slip op. at 2.
'601d. slip op. at 6. Judge Stephenson said the evidence would have supported a finding of neglect under
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03(B) or dependency under OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04(C).
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public concerns about the foster care system and lack of permanency for children
in the custody of Children Services Boards.'61 In the two years since its im-
plementation courts have applied its provisions in a variety of ways. Many cases
governed by H. B. 695 have reached courts of appeals; none has yet been
accepted for review by the Ohio Supreme Court.
With one exception 162 thus far, the application of the law has been pro-
spective. There may yet be some children who were in temporary custody at
the time of the bill's implementation, October 24, 1980, and on behalf of whom
agencies will yet file motions for permanent custody. However, because of the
two-year grace period given to agencies to comply with certain requirements
of the bill' 63 and because that time period has now passed, there should no
longer by a problem of retrospective application. All cases of child custody vested
in a Children Services Board are now subject to all provisions of H.B. 695.
The three main areas for determination by the court (good faith effort
on the part of the agencies to reunite, adequate parental care, and best interests
of the child) remain basically undefined. The cases heard thus far have reflected
a wide variance in the meaning of these terms and, consequently, in their
application. The extent of the efforts agencies must make in their efforts to
reunite range from none, if they can demonstrate such an attempt to be futile' 6'
or if a parent is inaccessible, 65 to years of services extending to the adulthood
of the child. 66
To establish that a child is one without adequate parental care and will
continue to be a child without adequate parental care in the near future re-
quires some consensus on what is "adequate" and what constitutes the "near
future." It also requires an ability to foretell the future, something that no
one in the field of human behavior has yet been able to accomplish.6 7 Ob-
viously, courts do not agree on what kind of care is adequate for a particular
child nor whether "adequate" care of one or two children in a family
automatically constitutes an identical ability to provide "adequate" care to all
children in the family. The experience of child welfare agencies that parents
may be limited in the numbers of children or the kinds of children for whom
they can properly care seems not to be recognized by the courts. 68 As is evi-
dent from the cases reviewed, both from the language of the opinions and from
the acts of reversal and remand, courts differ on how far the "near future"
'See e.g., Boyle, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
162In re King, No. 10165, (Summit County Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1981).
"'In re Smith, No. 31-CA-52, (Green County Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1982).
'64In re Tan, No. 10654, (Summit County Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1982).
161In re Wiseman, No. CA 2797, (Licking County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
1'6In re Ratcliffe, No. 80CA5, (Gallia County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
1'See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 2 at 50-52.
"MIn re Dillon, No. 1747, (Wayne County Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1981); see also In re Smith, No. 10335, (Summit
County Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1982).
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extends. The courts appear not to view time from the standpoint of the child,
whose concept of time is far different from that of adults,' 69 nor even to weigh
the effects of time except as it impacts on the parents.'" 0 Children grow and
develop new attachments while waiting for their parents who may or may not,
struggle to make needed changes in their lives. Courts cannot lose sight of the
balance which needs to be maintained between the rights of parents to their
children and the rights of their children to a safe, permanent home. The place-
ment of children must be treated by agencies and courts as a matter of urgency
which gives consideration of a child's sense of time by granting such cases a
high priority, by dealing with them rapidly, and by accelerating the course of
review and final decision. Any temporary placement must be limited to the
shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution.' 7 ' Children need
parents when they are children.' 72
The new law has kept the best interests of the child standard but appears
to make this a lesser consideration than previously; it is now just one of three
determinations the courts must make before an award of permanent custody.' 73
While this was the controlling factor in pre-H. B. 695 cases of child custody,
some courts no longer even reach this determination if they decide that an agency
has not made a good faith effort to reunite'74 or that a child is not without
adequate parental care nor likely to be without adequate parental care in the
near future.' 75 Thus, the best interests standard, once the matter of paramount
importance, appears in some instances to receive less consideration by the courts
than do the agency's efforts and the parents' progress. This seems to support
a presumption that the child's best interests are necessarily served by continued
temporary care while agencies and parents make further efforts at rehabilita-
tion of the parents and reunification of the family. This is in direct contradic-
tion of the legislature's intent to prevent children from remaining too long in
foster care and to establish permanency in their young lives.'
7 6
The evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence places an in-
creased, yet undefined, burden on agencies seeking permanent custody of
children at a time when the factors for the courts' consideration in each case
have also been increased."'7 The intent is the protection of the parents' rights
to their children. The law presumes that such protections ultimately function
"'See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT supra note 2 at 40-45.
"In re Ratcliffe, No. 80CA5 (Gallia County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
"'See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT supra note at 44-45.
'See Freedman, supra note 24 at 3.
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(A)(3) (Page Supp. 1982).
"'In re King, No. 10165, (Summit County Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1981); In re Ratcliffe, No. 80CA5, (Gallia
County Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
"'In re Smith, No. 10335, (Summit County Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1981).
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5153.16 (Page 1982).
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(A)(1)(2)(3) (Page Supp. 1982).
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to protect the child which is true only if the child's interests are best served
by continuing parental custody. Certainly, the appointment of the guardian
ad litem is some protection of the child's rights, 78 but it seems inescapable
that the law's provisions, with the greater standard of evidence required, operate
to maintain parental rights of custody at significant cost to some children who
ought to be released for permanent placement.
Our society recognizes that the vast majority of parents are capable of
fulfilling their responsibilities to care for and nurture their children. 79 It also
recognizes that some children are in need of protection when their parents cannot
provide at least a minimal level of care. The law provides for state interven-
tion when conditions of dependency, neglect, or abuse occur. Ohio law requires
specific steps to be taken to reunify those families where temporary removal
of custody has proven necessary to ensure the child's safety and well-being. 180
The law has focused attention on the duty of agencies to provide various
rehabilitative services, and it has focused on the expectation of parents to utilize
these services to make changes deemed necessary for the return of their children
to their care."'8 On the other hand, the law appears to have drawn attention
from the child and his or her needs and best interests. Instead, the courts are
forced into making measurements of agencies' efforts and parents' progress.
The nebulous language of the law provides few guidelines to the courts in making
these determinations. As has been shown, the results are a wide disparity in
application of the law's various provisions and, unfortunately, the perpetua-
tion of children in a state of limbo, a condition the legislation was intended
to correct. Additionally, no one knows for how many children permanent
planning is unnecessarily postponed because agencies, which have in good faith
worked to reunite families, delay asking for permanent custody because they
realistically believe that the courts will view their efforts as insufficient or will
view the parents' very minimal progress as a positive sign of potential improve-
ment. Instead, the agencies continue providing services to the parents and con-
tinue the temporary care of the children. Whatever the reasons, the fact remains
that the system continues to permit Ohio children to remain too long in situa-
tions of temporary care and custody. The children must wait for conditions
to be resolved over which they, unfortunately, have no control. The ultimate
responsibility to free these children for permanent placement at appropriate
time rests with Ohio's courts and the extent to which they apply the law to
achieve its intended purpose.
NORMA BLANK, A.C.S.W.
.'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(B) (Page Supp. 1982).
"'See Boyle, supra note 17.
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.412 (Page Supp. 1982).
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.412, 2151.414 (Page Supp. 1982).
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